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ABSTRACT
Symphony orchestras are the supposed victims of a
malignant disease entitled "Baumol's Disease."

This disease

occurs as costs rise at a faster rate than earned income.
The gap between earned income and costs is called the
"Income Gap."

The remedy is injections of cash to stop the

disease from expanding.
This thesis takes actual data from the American
Symphony Orchestra League and tests Baumol's diagnosis.
The data are first analyzed historically to measure if the
income gap does exit and if it is growing over time.
results show that this is the case.

The

Symphony orchestras

experienced a significant growth in the income gap between
1979 and 1986.
To determine if the income gap is an incurable disease,
a more comprehensive model is developed.

A deficit model is

designed including output composition variables, demographic
variables, and the lagged value of the income gap.

This

model shows that, in the majority of cases, symphony
orchestras are not the victims of Baumol's Disease.

The

symphonies can control their destiny, at least in the long
run.
Included within the paper is a review of selected
literature including empirical studies similar to this one.
iii

This provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the
empirical results.

The results point out that the

perseverance and durability of symphony orchestras may be
underestimated.

The injections of cash to alleviate the

disease may only be a placebo for the majority of
symphonies.

It is in their power to stay healthy.
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INTRODUCTION
Symphony orchestras in the United States rely on earned
income, contributions and grants in order to operate.

It is

believed that costs rise at a faster rate than earned
income, signaling a growing need for tertiary support, in
the form of private contributions or government grants, for
orchestras to stay performing.

The "income gap", as

originally defined by Baumol and Bowen, is the difference
between earned income of a performing arts organization and
total costs.1
The performing arts are a labor intensive industry.
They rely greatly on labor (performers), in order to perform
a concert.

Because the performing arts are predominantly

labor intensive, they cannot achieve the productivity gains
which more capital intensive industries experience through
innovation.

They are unable to lessen substantially their

dependency on labor.

For this reason, revenue lags costs.

Baumol and Bowen argue the need for an ever increasing
public support of the performing arts.

This unbalanced

productivity growth is called "Baumol's disease."
Baumol's disease is malignant, in the sense that the

1William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, Performing
Arts - The Economic Dilemma (New York: Twentieth Century
Fund, 1966), 147.
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gap between earned income and costs is ever expanding.2

If

the performing arts are to continue, they will require
injections of cash to combat the disease they face.

Baumol

and Bowen make it clear that the responsibility must be
taken by society:
The size of the total income gap is a crucial
figure. This is the amount which, at the present
time, society must be prepared to contribute, by
some means, if the nation's existing performing
arts organizations are to be kept solvent.3

Society must bridge the gap between earned income and
expenditures, either through private contributions or
government subsidy.
The purpose of this thesis is to test Baumol's
diagnosis with particular reference to symphony orchestras
in the United States.

This report has five principal parts.

First, I will review selected literature concerning the
economics of the performing arts and symphony orchestras.
Second, I will identify the data set used in this
investigation.

Third, the models employed in this analysis

will be specified.

Fourth, I will examine the results

obtained in this study.

Finally, the report will end with a

concluding comment.

2Ibid., 161. The growing income gap assumes that other
industries are experiencing productivity gains.
3Ibid., 150.
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THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Baumol's diagnosis can be broken down into two testable
assertions.

The first is that the income gap exists.

The

second is that the income gap is inevitable.
The empirical tests of the first assertion are not
extensive, because the data are difficult to obtain.
Using data from Australia, Throsby and Withers empirically
tested the income gap in symphony orchestras, and found the
gap between earned income and aggregate costs to exist, and
to be growing over time.4

Baumol and Bowen themselves have

found the gap to exist and to be expanding.5

Yet both

studies have the deficiency of few observations in their
samples (11 orchestras for Baumol-Bowen, and 2 for ThrosbyWithers).

Conclusions concerning all symphony orchestras in

the United States are difficult to make from such limited
samples.
The second assertion concerns the inevitability of the
income gap.

To deal with this question, we must look at the

specific characteristics of the performing arts.

All

symphony orchestras in the American Symphony Orchestra
League are organized as nonprofit firms.

Why is this the

4David Throsby and Glenn Withers, The Economics of the
Performing Arts
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1979), 137.
5Baumol and Bowen, 423.
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case?
Symphony orchestras organize as nonprofit firms and
depend on donations for a substantial fraction of their
income.6

Firms which rely on donations normally organize

as nonprofit firms for two reasons.
made to them are tax deductible.

First, any donations

Second, people who make

donations to nonprofit firms take less risk that the money
they donate will go to purposes which they find undesirable.
Donations made for specific purposes go toward those same
purposes.

Furthermore, nonprofit firms in the United States

receive their charter from the government.

They are

considered "stamped and approved" as worthwhile
philanthropic organizations, helping to facilitate donations
from private sources.

Orchestras rely on these donations in

order to perform.
Hansmann provides a theoretical framework as to why
performing arts organizations are organized as nonprofit
firms.

He argues that the demand curve faced by most

performing arts organizations is below their average total
cost curve at all quantities of output.

There is not one

price which they can charge to cover their average total
costs.

By organizing as nonprofit firms, symphonies

facilitate their ability to solicit donations and establish

^enry Hansmann, "Nonprofit Enterprise in the
Performing Arts," Bell Journal of Economics 12, (1981):
341-361. Hansmann estimates between one-third and one-half
of their income.
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an average price which covers average total costs.7
The typical audience attending symphony orchestra
performances is characterized as financially well to do.
According to Hansmann, a large proportion of the donations
received come from those who attend the performing arts
organizations' functions (e.g., symphony orchestra
concerts).
tickets.

In other words, those who donate money also buy

Hansmann terms this activity, "voluntary price

discrimination."
The performing arts are generally characterized by high
fixed costs.8

Symphony orchestras are housed in areas with

a large number of seats, and a staging area from which to
perform.

Fixed costs, by their nature, are constant

regardless of the number of performances.
expand the number

of performances to

Orchestras may
lower their average

costs, or they may allow other activities to take place in
the concert hall and receive rent income.

The marginal cost

of one more performance is comparatively low.

Since fixed

costs are a large fraction of total cost, it is logical to
expand the number of performances to bring down the average
costs.

If symphonies set the ticket price to match the low

marginal cost of an additional performance (or an additional
attender if not sold out), they will fail to cover their

7Where average price includes all donations.
8Hansmann, "Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing
Arts," 341-361.

total costs.

Hansmann concludes that if performing arts

organizations practice price discrimination, they can
capture enough consumer surplus to cover their total costs.
Some price discrimination actually exists (eg., more is
charged for the better seats), but is limited and
insufficient to cover total costs.

Hansmann and Baumol and

Bowen contend that performing arts organizations hope that
their patrons voluntarily pay an additional amount, in the
form of donations, if the value they place on attendance
exceeds the price charged for admission.
Most performing arts organizations find themselves in a
predicament.

With nonprofit firms, ticket price increases

tend to decrease donations.9 As costs rise, nonprofit
performing arts organizations will not try to immediately
raise ticket prices, but rather attempt to increase the
contributions they receive from patrons, or turn to the
government for grants.
Both Baumol and Bowen and Hansmann agree that
performing arts industries do not experience the same gains
in productivity as other industries.

Thus, the income gap

exists and inevitably widens over time.

Society must

9William Luksetich and Mark Lange.
"Modelling and
Estimating Nonprofit Behavior: Symphony Orchestras, 1991"
TMs [photocopy], 18-21, St. Cloud State University, Saint
Cloud, Minnesota. Luksetich and Lange have found that price
increases will significantly decrease attendance for all
symphony orchestras. They have also found that gifts will
significantly decrease for Major Orchestras.
Price
increases were found to significantly increase gifts in
Small Budget Orchestras.
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contribute financial support to prevent the demise of the
performing arts.

This contribution can be made either

through private donations, or through government subsidy.
If productivity growth was assumed constant across all
industries, symphony orchestras will find it difficult to
match the productivity increases through wage increases.
The rising costs which wage increases represent, would not
pass to consumers through higher prices.

These

organizations will search out more donations and pursue
grants, or idly watch their labor migrate toward higher wage
industries.
If productivity growth was assumed to be higher in more
capital intensive industries,

(e.g., manufacturing) then

symphony orchestras would be in even more of a dilemma.
There will be less gains from productivity to offset
increasing costs (specifically the increasing wage bill).
The pressure on symphony orchestras will increase, forcing
them to lessen their dependency on the labor market by
changing output composition toward less labor intensive
performances.

In the extreme case, symphony orchestras will

be forced to cut variable costs to zero and have no
performances.

This will occur, unless the income gap is met

by society through donations and government grants.
The present study has as its focus the analysis of a
data set on American symphony orchestras.

The purpose of

the analysis is to determine the credibility of the Baumol

8

assertions of (1) the existence of the income gap and (2)
its inevitability.
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THE DATA
The data set employed in this study is one obtained
from the American Symphony Orchestra League.10

The full

data set is comprised of some 136 variables across the eight
years from 1979 to 1986 for 53 orchestras.
The variables examined in this study are those given in
Table 1.

All orchestral variables (X, Y, and Z variables in

Table 1) have the raw values provided in the data set or are
generated therefrom.

The demographic variables (I, M, N,

and 0 variables in Table 1) were taken from Sales and
Marketing Management.11

The variables expressed in money

terms were converted from nominal to real values using the
GNP Implicit Price Deflator and are thus expressed in 1982
dollars.12

The means and standard deviations for the

examined variables are then given in Table 2.13

10The American Symphony Orchestra League is an
orchestra trade association headquartered in Washington DC.
11Sales and Marketing Management. 28 July 1978, cl-c228
and subsequent eight July issues.
12Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the
President ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1990), 298.
13The output composition variables (X1 through X10 in
Table 2) sum to more than one. This occurs because of
double counting. For example, some regular subscription
concerts are performed by a full orchestra.

10

Variables:
Deficit

(Yt)

Table 1
Names and Definitions

Earned income minus costs.

Lagged
(Yt.,)
Deficit

The deficit lagged by one period.

Average
Revenue

(Yt)

Earned income excluding private and public
subsidies, divided by total concerts.

Average
Costs

(Yt)

Total costs of the orchestra divided by
total concerts.

Regular
(X,)
Subscription

The number of regular subscriptions
concerts divided by total concerts.

Nonsummer (X2)
Subscription

The number of non summer subscription
concerts divided by total concerts.

Other
(X,)
Home Concerts

The number of other home concerts divide'
by total concerts.

C/Y/S
(XJ
Concerts

The number of child, youth, student
concerts divided by total concerts.

Summer
(X5)
Subscription

The number of summer subscription concerts
divided by total concerts.

Other
(X6)
Sum Concerts

The number of other summer concerts divided
by total concerts.

Full
(X7)
Orchestra

The number of concerts performed with a
full orchestra divided by total concerts.

Chamber
(X8)
Concerts

The number of chamber orchestra
performances divided by total concerts.

Free
(X,)
Home Concerts

The number of free concerts in the home
area divided by total concerts.

Special
(X10)
Constituents

The number of concerts for special
constituents divided by total concerts.

Pop
18 - 24

(N^

Percent of the home metropolitan area or
county population between ages 18 and 24.

Pop
25 - 34

(N2)

Percent of the home metropolitan area or
county population between ages 25 and 34.

Pop
35 - 49

(N3)

Percent of the home metropolitan area or
county population between ages 3 5 and 49.

Pop
50 +

(NJ

Percent of the home metropolitan area or
county population 50 years old or older.
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Inc > 25 (I)

The percent of households with nominal
income greater than twenty-five thousand
dollars.

Median
(M)
HH Income

The median household income in the home
metropolitan area or county.

Population

(0)

The population in the home metropolitan
area or county.

No. of
players

(Z,)

The average number of players in the
orchestra who are paid under a weekly
contract.

Average
Salary

(Z2)

The average salary of a player per week.

a (alpha)

The constant term.

e (epsilon)

The error term.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations () of Variables
Variables

Premier

Major

Metropol

Sml Budg

Deficit

-4173000
(1154300)

-3022000
(1252400)

-881000
(483270)

-299110
(187970)

Average
Revenue

19200
(4448)

7003
(4868)

2958
(1889)

1795
(1207)

Average
Costs

26048
(5582)

13203
(6479)

5789
(3601)

3700
(2598)

Regular
Subscription

.4125
(.1480) .

.2837
(.1274)

.1790
(.1320)

.2780
(.2700)

Nonsummer
Subscription

.0053
(.0354)

.0700
(.0521)

.0610
(.0680)

.0220
(.0557)

Other Home
Concerts

.0678
(.0777)

.0980
(.0825)

.0870
(.0780)

.0460
(.0471)

C/Y/S
Concerts

.0710
(.0419)

.1130
(.0864)

.1150
(.1070)

.0670
(.0636)

Summer
Subscription

.0690
(.0800)

.0320
(.0479)

.0032
( .0110)

.0070
(.0261)

Other Summer
Concerts

.0780
(.0758)

.0580
(.0690)

.0067
( .0140)

.0300
(.0600)

Full
Orchestra

.8578
(.1640)

.7870
(.2170)

.5260
(.2940)

.4987
(.3520)

Chamber
Concerts

.0295
(.0419)

.1000
(.1140)

.1332
(.1630)

.0810
(. 1310)

Free Home
Concerts

.0250
(.0535)

.0720
(.1160)

.1090
(.1900)

.1770
(.2630)

Special
Constituents

.0010
(.0021)

.0120
(.0290)

.0240
(.0490)

.0200
(.0547)

Pop 18-24

12.23
(.93)

12.90
(1.43)

12.86
(1.07)

13.14
(2.50)

Pop 25-24

17.14
(.81)

18.43
(1.77)

17.94
(1.09)

17 .09
(1.40)

Pop 35-49

18.16
(1.08)

18.21
(1.50)

17.87
(1.16)

17.45
(1.40)

Pop 50 +

26.78
(2.26)

23.20
(3.47)

24.40
(1.22)

25.66
(4.84)
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31.08
(12.81)

29.71
(13.53)

25.29
(11.59)

22.24
(10.65)

25739
(1454)

25372
(2593)

22989
(2027)

21740
(2087)

8254000
(5122100)

2171000
(1241200)

925380
(343590)

534390
(288430)

No. of
players

104.90
(1.43)

85.35
(18.69)

41.00
(29.34)

7.70
(17.00)

Average
Salary

615
(338)

503
(207)

292
(185)

82
(210)

Inc > 2 5
Median HH
Income
Population
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To afford a measure of detail in the analysis, the data
are arranged into four cross-section subset classifications
by size of the budget from large to small.

These four

classifications are (1) Premier Orchestras,

(2) Major

Orchestras,

(3) Metropolitan Orchestras, and (4) Small

Budget Orchestras.
suggested by Hale.14

The Premier Orchestra class is that
The remaining three classes are those

used for reporting purposes by the Statistical Abstract of
the United States.15

This classification scheme results in

6, 21, 11, and 15 orchestras in each of the above classes,
respectively.16
The data set thus permits the examination of the
orchestral deficits for four classes of orchestras over the
period from 1979 to 1986.

It is of interest to note that

these years were potentially difficult years for symphony
orchestras.

The double digit inflation of the late 197 0s

was followed by the recession of 1981-1982.

The 1983-1986

^Rosemary Hale, "Economics and the Symphony
Orchestra," TMs, photocopied. A paper presented at the
1983 Midwest Economic Association Meeting.
Six "Class A"
orchestras are identified: the Boston Symphony, Chicago
Symphony, Cleveland Orchestra, Los Angeles Philharmonic, New
York Philharmonic, the Philadelphia Orchestra.
15Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States. ([Washington,
D.C.]: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980).
16This classification scheme not only differentiates
the orchestras by budget, but by performance activity. The
mean number of annual performances for Premier Orchestras is
231, for Major Orchestras it is 201, for Metropolitan
Orchestras it is 163, and for Small Budget Orchestras it is
136.

years were characterized by low inflation and economic
expansion.

However, this was also the time of the Reagan

administration, which opposed federal support for the arts
Thus, the time period examined was not one in which
incentives were particularly favorable to the arts in
general and symphonies in particular.
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THE MODELS
The Baumol assertions are tested in the context of two
models.

The first, the growth model, is constructed to test

the initial assertion of the existence of the income gap.
The second, the deficit model, is presented for the purpose
of testing the assertion of the inevitability of the income
gap.
The Growth Model.
The growth model is given in the following expression:

(1)

Yc =

P iV i,

where Yt is the current year deficit,

+ c e,

is the deficit

lagged by one year, and et is the error term.
Equation 1 provides two pieces of information
concerning the deficit.

The first is whether the deficit

persists from one period to the next period.

This is

determined by calculating a t-statistic to test if the
coefficient on the lagged deficit is significantly different
from zero.

An insignificant coefficient is the basis for

acceptance of the null hypothesis that the deficit is not
exhibiting growth? conversely, a significant result will
lead to an acceptance of the alternative hypothesis that the
deficit is growing from one year to the next.

The second
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piece of information that Equation 1 presents is determined
through a different t-test.

If the coefficient on the

lagged deficit is significantly greater than one, the
average growth rate of the deficit from 1979 to 1986 is
determined.

By subtracting one from the coefficient, the

average growth rate in the income gap over the 1979 to 1986
period is calculated.

This will lead us to accept the

alternative hypothesis that the income gap exists and is
growing.
Similar specifications are used to determine the growth
in earned income and in costs.

The same two t-tests are

conducted to determine whether significant growth rates
exist in income and costs.

This will shed light on whether

the deficit is a cost or a revenue side phenomenon.
The Deficit Model.
The deficit model is used to test the assertion of the
inevitability of the income gap or deficit.

The deficit is

calculated by taking the earned income from performances and
subtracting costs.

Those variables which affect revenue and

those which influence cost must both be included.

Thus, to

build a deficit model, revenue and cost specifications are
preliminarily developed.
The revenue specification is built to test the effect
of output composition on the revenues of symphonies, holding
demographic characteristics constant.

The model follows:

18

(2)
yt =
« + M i + p2x, + P3Ar3 + p4* 4
+ p5x 5 + p6x6 + p7x7 + p 8x 8 + p9^ + p10x 10
+

Pu^l

+

Pl7^ + ®t'

+

Pl2*2

+

Pl3^3

+

Pl4^4

+

Pl5^

+

Pl6^

where Yt is earned income per concert; X, through X 10 are
output composition variables defined in Table 1; N, through
0 are demographic characteristics also defined in Table 1;
and et is the error term.
Symphony orchestras perform different types of
concerts.

The output composition variables represent the

different types of concerts as a proportion of total
concerts.

Significant coefficients on these variables

suggest income sensitive types of output.

In other words,

orchestras can change their output composition in order to
increase income.

The N, M, I, and 0 variables represent

demographic characteristics.

These are held constant

through each cross section, as we look at the impact of
output composition on revenues.
The cost side specification relates orchestral costs to
selected output and input variables.

The cost model is as

follows:

(3)

Yt =

a

+

+

P2X8 +

p3Z4 +

P4Z2 + ec,

where Yt is the cost per concert; X7 and X8 are output

19

composition variables; Z, and Z2 are input variables; and et
is the error term.
The output composition variables are included in the
cost specification as they are expected to significantly
influence costs.

These are full orchestra concerts

chamber concerts

as a

respectively.

and

percentage of total concerts,

The cost of putting the full orchestra on the

stage is larger than putting a chamber group on stage.17
The Z variables represent the wages and the number of
workers, respectively.
The deficit model then combines the revenue and cost
specifications:

(4)

Yt =

+ P5*4 +
+

Pll*10

+

Pl6^

+

+

a

+

p6X 5+
Pl2^1

Pl7 M

+

p2*i

p7* 6 + p 8^
+

+

Pl3^2

Pl8^

+

+

p3*2 +

p4X3

+ p9* 8 + pi0* 9
Pl4^3

+ Pl9^1

+

+

Pl5^4

P 20^2 + ®t'

where Yt is the current year deficit.
This model is not developed to empirically define the
deficit.

Rather, it is developed to test if the orchestras

have some control over their deficits —

to test whether

output composition decisions can be made to lower the
deficit.

It will suggest which variables are under the

17The percent of total concerts performed by ensembles are
not included. Doing this would create a singular matrix.
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orchestra's control, thus demonstrating their ability to
reduce and perhaps eliminate the income gap.
The coefficient on the lagged deficit (Yt-1) gives us
direct information concerning the inevitability of the
income gap.

The t-statistic for this variable will show if

the coefficient is significantly different from zero.

A

different t test is conducted to determine if the
coefficient is significantly different from one.

A computed

t-statistic larger than the critical value of 1.96 will
suggest a decreasing deficit over the period from 1979 to
1986, other things equal.

This result would cast some doubt

on Baumol's assertion that the deficit is inevitable.
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THE RESULTS
With the models constructed, we may now turn to examine
the results obtained in this study.
The Growth Model Results.
The growth model results are given in Tables 3, 4, and
5.

Provided here are the findings for the

deficit, revenue

and cost growth models, respectively.
Table 3 shows the results of the deficit growth model.
Two different t-statistics are given in the Table.

The

first demonstrates whether the coefficient on the lagged
deficit is significantly different from zero.
cross sections this is the case.

For all four

This suggests that a

larger deficit in the current period leads to a larger
deficit in the next period, from 1979 to 1986.
The
from the

second t-statistic is computed by subtracting one
coefficient on the lagged deficit and dividing by

the standard error.

For each of the four classifications,

the coefficients on the lagged deficit are significantly
different from one.

By subtracting one from the coefficient

and multiplying by 100, the growth rate of the deficit is
computed.

The deficit of Premier Orchestras are observed to

be growing by 5.33 percent over the 1979 to 1986 period.
The growth in the deficit of Major Orchestras is 3.69
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percent.

For

Metropolitan Orchestras the deficit is

growing at a 9.69 percent rate over the period, while the
Small Budget Orchestra deficit is growing at a 9.42 percent
rate.

Table 3
Deficit Growth Model
Orchestra

Coefficient on
Lagged Deficit

t-statistic
from zero

t-statistic
from one

Premier

1.0533

100.900

3.500

Major

1.0369

135.640

4.830

Metropol.

1.0969

63.194

5.580

Small
Budget

1.0942

80.408

6.920

Table 4
Revenue Growth Model
Orchestra

Coefficient on
Lagged Revenue

t-statistic
from zero

t-statistic
from one

Premier

1.065

127.320

7.790

Major

1.068

130.760

8.330

Metropol.

1.034

95.015

3 .160

Small
Budget

1.061

81.488

4.660
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Table 5
Cost Growth Model
Orchestras

Coefficients on
Lagged Cost

t-statistic
from zero

t-statistic
from one

Premier

1.066

127.320

7.790

Major

1.062

176.510

10.060

Metropol.

1.045

87.728

3.810

Small
Budget

1.072

88.630

5.980

This leads us to accept the alternative hypothesis that
the income gap exists.

It can be said with 95 percent

confidence that the Baumol assertion that the income gap
exists and is growing is correct.
The results in Table 4 and 5 use a specification
similar to that in equation 1.

The difference is that Y is

earned income and costs respectively.
are conducted.

The same two t-tests

This suggests that revenues and costs have

significant growth rates over the 1979 to 1986 period.
This is of interest as it shows both costs and
revenues, in real dollars, growing from 1979 to 198 6.

From

these observed results it is not possible to conclude that
the income gap is either a cost or a revenue side
phenomenon.
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The Deficit Model Results.
The deficit model was constructed from separate revenue
and cost models.

The results for the revenue, or earned

income, specification appear in Table 6 while those for the
cost specification are given in Table 7.
The revenue specification shows that output composition
has a significant effect on the earned income for each
classification.

For example, revenue per concert

significantly increases as the percent of regular
subscription concerts increases for all but Premier
Orchestras.

This model also shows the effects of exogenous,

demographic variables on earned income per concert.

The

population variable has a significant positive influence on
Metropolitan and Major Orchestras, a significant negative
effect on Premier Orchestras, and no significant
relationship with Small Budget Orchestras.18
The results for the cost specification suggest that
output composition has a significant impact on costs for all
but Premier Orchestras.

The number of players under weekly

contract and the average salary per week variables are
included because of an a priori belief that they have a
positive impact on cost per concert.

For Premier

Orchestras, the number of players variable has a significant
18A. Buse, "Goodness-of-Fit in the Generalized Least
Squares Estimation,"
The American Statistician
27 (1979):
106-108. This R-square is corrected for pooled, cross section
data.
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negative impact on costs per concert.19
The results for the deficit model,

which combines the

foregoing revenue and cost specifications, are given in
Table 8.
It is apparent from these results that certain of the
output composition variables are significantly related to
the deficits for each of the orchestral

cross sections with

the exception of Small Budget Orchestras.

In the case of

Premier Orchestras, other summer concerts increase the
deficit; here a one percent increase in other summer
concerts, other things equal, increases the deficit by about
$52,000.20

In the case of Major Orchestras, increases in

summer subscriptions and other summer concerts significantly
increase the deficit.

The deficit among Metropolitan

Orchestras is increased by greater numbers of regular
subscription, non-summer subscription, and other home
concerts.

On the whole, these results suggest that the

larger orchestras can influence to some degree their
deficits by altering their output mix of concerts.

19The marginal cost of hiring an additional worker is
apparently less than the resulting increase in the average
costs for these orchestras.
20The dependent variable, earned income deficit, has a
negative sign in all of its observation values. Negative
signs on the coefficients of the independent variables
signals a direct relationship between the independent
variable and the deficit since the deficit is a negative
number in the data set.
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Table 6
Revenue Model — All Orchestras
Independent
Variables

Premier
Orchestra

Major
Orchestra

Metropol
Orchestra

107.42 *
(7.1)

77.95 *
(8.13)

Small
Budget

Regular
Subscriptions

80.11
(1.2)

Non Summer
Subscriptions

172.87 *
(3.03)

90.44 *
(4.02)

19.788
(1.6)

16.8
(1.82)

Other Home
Concerts

63.451
(1.39)

39.61 *
(2.25)

-16.63
(-1.44)

-6.96
(-.73)

C/Y/S
Concerts

-13.56
(-.097)

Summer
Subscriptions
Other Summer
Concerts
Full
Orchestra
Chamber
Concerts
Free Home
Concerts
Special
Constituents
Pop 18-24

85.91
(1.07)

-22.1
(-1.42)
78.38 *
(2.76)

19.18 *
(2.85)

-21.32 *
(-2.79)

-16.30
(-1.4)

105.23 *
(2.49)

-33.95 *
(-2.45)
-21.73 *
(-2.51)

-66.68
(-1.24)

15.22
(.752)

12.58
(.396)

70.88
(1.27)

6.94
(.596)

18.48 *
(2.67)

21.70 *
(4.04)

-233.92 *
(-3.85)

22.328
(1.84)

3.4
(.83)

12.69 *
(3.27)

17.07
(.312)

7.64
(-1.22)

-5.36 *
(-2.09)

-2.93 *
(-2.39)

558.72
(.764)

-21.13
(-.84)

6.92
(.601)

1. 08
(.293)

-.0311
(-.0034)

.148
(.119)

-2.34 *
(-1.96)

1.31 *
(3.42)

-.733
(-.469)

2.76 *
(3.35)

1.12 *
(2.4)

Pop 25-34

32.35 *
(5.7)

Pop 35-49

17.9 *
(2.84)

Pop 50+

.822
(.815)

Income > 25

-.143
(-1.31)

Median HH
Income

-.768 *
(-6.09)

5.7 *
(4.26)

.979
(1.07)

1.98 *
(3.85)

2.59 *
(2.5)

1.2
(1.92)

.195
(1.4)

.0798
(1.38)

.0513
(1.19)

.0186
(.877)

-.0656
(-1.33)

-.0701
(-1.87)

.0178
(.922)
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-.0031 ♦
(-2.6)

.0076 *
(3.7)

Constant

-572.68 *
(-2.78)

-138.3 *
(-2.45)

Buse R-square

.9589

.9075

.9604

.8459

F Statistic

41.206

86.535

99.879

32.93

Population

.0039 *
(2.19)
-47.00
(-1.01)

.0037
(1.4)
-78.93 *
(-4.83)

t-statistics are in parentheses ().
♦Coefficient significantly different from zero.

Table 7
Cost Model — All Orchestras
Independent
Variables
Full
Orchestra
Chamber
Concerts

Premier
Orchestra

Major
Orchestra

Metropol
Orchestra

Small
Budget

69.1
(1.01)

142.49 ♦
(9.41)

84.66 ♦
(11.4)

60.43 ♦
(17.1)

-169.92
(-1.06)

101.48 ♦
(4.61)

19.31
(1.64)

38.95 ♦
(5.1)

No. of players
week contract

-7.88 ♦
(-2.21)

.404 ♦
(2.13)

.0564
(.899)

.0275
(.782)

Avg. Salary
per week

.00303
(.193)

.0118
(1.33)

.0429 ♦
(4.09)

.0012
(.656)

Constant

1027.6 ♦
(2.7)

-30.1
(-1.8)

-4.058
(-.86)

5.74 *
(3.85)

Buse R-square

.1670

.4217

.9641

.7655

F Statistic

2.156

29.717

47.1

93.856

t-statistics are in parentheses ().
♦Coefficient is significantly different from zero.
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Table 8
Deficit Model - All Orchestras
Independent
Variables
Lagged
Deficit

Premier
Orchestra

Major
Orchestra

Metropol.
Orchestra

.701 *
(3.64)

.6996 *
(14.46)

.8015 *
(9.36)

Small
Budget
.89 *
(15.9)

Regular
Subscriptions

7770
(.25)

7420.2
(1.42)

-6667.2 *
(-2.2)

330.3
(-7)

Non Summer
Subscriptions

-28037
(-.7)

8177.6
( 1.31)

-8892.6 *
(-2.2)

928.2
(.8)

Other Home
Concerts

-30541
(-1.2)

3282.1
(.61)

-12297 *
(-2.8)

1261
(1.4)

C/Y/S
Concerts

-45898
(-.9)

4934
(1.14)

-573.8
(-.23)

357.1
(.37)

Summer
Subscriptions

-42010
(-1.1)

-18062 *
(-2.8)

2570.5
(.18)

13.1
(.01)

Other Summer
Concerts

-52001 *
(-1.98)

-15384 *
(-2.8)

-17281
(-1.7)

147.8
(.23)

Full
Orchestra

15306
(.65)

-6365.7
(-1.8)

4064.4
(1.75)

-367
(-.8)

Chamber
Concerts

-6275.9
(-.23)

3289.8
(1.13)

1669.7
(1.3)

448.2
(1.3)

Free Home
Concerts

-6297.4
(-.45)

1681.3
(.68)

1360.3
(1.51)

-311
(-1.5)

Special
Constituents

318130
(1.1)

2124.9
(.22)

-1657
(-.5)

-409
(-.5)

Pop 18-24

122.49
(.04)

-678.67
(-1.80)

-89.61
(-.26)

60.1
(1.21)

Pop 25-34

932.45
(.426)

303.92
(.69)

-247.08
(-1.09)

-217 *
(-3.7)

Pop 35-49

-3433.6
(-1.65)

-745.27
(-1.87)

-104.96
(-.3)

55.48
(.85)

Pop 50 +

270.78
(.58)

-24.96
(-.14)

67.333
(.338)

4.88
(.19)

Income > 25

147.16 *
(2.68)

-56.17 *
(-2.78)

-10.82
(-.79)

-7.87 *
(-2.1)
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Median HH
Income

-129.8 *
(-2.04)

-.1005
(-.007)

Population

-.388
(-.802)

-2.74 *
(-5.64)

11.29
(1.07)

1. 71
(.886)

-.356
(-.414)

-.726 *
(-2.8)

-101.97
(-.18)

-12.4
(-.55)

-13.39 *
(-2.1)

-1.36
(-.42)

Avg. Salary
per week

4.51
(1.88)

-.24
(-.16)

-1.118
(-.797)

-.063
(-.3)

Constant

59627
(.55)

18964
(1.5)

2734.7
(.2)

1486
(.72)

# of players
week contract

Buse R-square

.9644

.9094

.9527

.9637

F Statistic

36.612

73.734

67.45

131.55

t-statistics are in parentheses.
♦Coefficient significantly different from zero.
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It was noted among these results that in the case of
Metropolitan Orchestras, increased regular subscription
concerts add to the deficit of such orchestras.

This result

suggests the possibility that Metropolitan Orchestras are
not maximizing just earned income, but rather both earned
income and contributions.

In other words, perhaps these

orchestras are practicing Hansmann's voluntary price
discrimination.
Important, as well, for our purpose, are the
coefficients on the lagged deficit.

In each case, this

coefficient is significantly greater than zero.

In the

cases of the Major, Metropolitan and Small Budget Orchestras
each coefficient was also found to be significantly less
than one.21

Apparently the income gap for these three

types of orchestras declined significantly over the examined
period.

Since the coefficient for Premier Orchestras was

not found to be significantly less than one, it appears that
the income gap among these orchestras did not decline
significantly over the examined period.
In sum, the results for the deficit model contain mixed
findings.

On the one hand, in the cases of Major and

Metropolitan Orchestras, the deficit was found to be
sensitive to the orchestras' output composition.

Moreover,

these deficits were found to have declined over the period
21The t-statistic for Major, Premier, Metropolitan and
Small Budget orchestras are -6.21, -1.55, -2.32, and -2.02,
respectively.
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analyzed.

On the other hand, Premier and Small Budget

Orchestras each had a unique situation.

For Premier

Orchestras the deficit was found to be sensitive to output
composition, yet it was found not to be significantly
declining.

For Small Budget Orchestras, the deficit

significantly declined over the period, yet none of the
output composition variables was significant.

The weight of

the evidence with respect to Major and Metropolitan
Orchestras is that the income gap is not inevitable while
the evidence with respect to Premier and Small Budget
Orchestras is mixed.
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THE CONCLUSIONS
This paper empirically tests Baumol's diagnosis of the
income gap for symphony orchestras.

The research problem

centered on an examination of two testable assertions.

The

first was that the income gap exists, and the second was
that it is inevitable.
These assertions were tested using a data set for 53
orchestras covering the period from 1979 to 1986.

The

orchestras were examined in the following four classes
determined by the size of budget:

Premier Orchestras, Major

Orchestras, Metropolitan Orchestras, and Small Budget
Orchestras.
A growth model was constructed to test the first
assertion.

It was found here that there was a significant

growth in the deficit for all orchestras over the period.
Thus, the deficit was found to be present and growing.
A deficit model containing output composition and
demographic control variables was constructed to test the
second assertion.

Here we found the income gap to be

decreasing, other things equal, in the Major, Metropolitan,
and Small Budget Orchestras.

This casts some doubt on the

inevitability of the income gap.

Furthermore, it was found

that the deficits in the Premier, Major, and Metropolitan
Orchestras were sensitive to the mix of concerts offered by

the orchestras.

The weight of this evidence suggests that

orchestras are to some extent able to exert control over
their deficits.
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